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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. The training program in the 45th Gds Mecz Regt was divided into two phases. The winter training phase was conducted in the permanent garrison area, and the summer training phase in the summer training camp. These two phases were in turn divided into two periods, each period lasting three months. The winter training phase started in 15 November and lasted until 15 May, and the summer training phase started on 15 May and lasted until 15 November. The training schedule was flexible and the information given below is only tentative. Some of the time was set aside for barracks cleaning, parades and similar activities. About 552 hours were devoted to training during the three-month period. The hours were subdivided in the following manner:

Subject	Number of hours
Small arms firing Infantry tactics Close order drill Physical training Sapper training (mining, demolition) Engineer training Political indoctrination Chemical warfare training Articles of war and military justice Map reading First aid, medical training Various company and battalion tactical problems	64 108 108 70 34 34 48 20 24 6
- decordar problems	30

2. The first three months of the winter training period consisted of instruction on the infantry squad, platoon and company levels. During the second three months the training schedule remained the same, but was conducted on company, battalion and regimental SECRET

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		s the winter to				
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· ·	e nucitt best	e march (10 to	15 km) in cont	ection wi	rs and consi. th a regiment	sted tel
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	Close order	drill			Š	
	Firing Physical tr	201212	•		6	
	Political f	Indoctrination			6 h	
	Sapper trai	lning (mining,	demolition)		9 9 9 6 4 3 3 1	
	Engineer tr First aid t	aining			3	
	Chemical wa	raining Irfare training	•			,
	Articles of	' war and milit	arv justice		1 2	
	Care and cl	eaning of weap	ons and equipm	ent	ī	
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and '	personal app	earance.				]
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	врес	cial training and armored tactics:
	(a)	A mecz regt was usually supported by a tank bn during an attack
25X1	-	on a field fortification type of position.
	(b)	Infantry support tanks within the meez regt were held by the
05.		regiment, until they were needed by the different rifle
25X′		battalions and companiesthe tanks were never used as a unit.
	(c)	Tanks were always required to be at the line of departure prior
	/	to the jump-off of the infantry. The tanks were held in
		concealment until the time of the jump-off, when they moved forward along the line of departure and past the infantry,
		which immediately jumped off. The specific sequence of events was always stressed during tactical training. It was emphasized
		that the infantry was under no circumstances to be outdistanced by the tanks and at no time was the infantry to be more than
		20 m behind the tanks.
	(d)	Tanks supported the infantry at all times during combat within
		enemy positions, but did not pursue the retreating enemy until the infantry was able to follow. It was inadvisable for the
		tanks to overextend their advance because of the danger of their
		being cut off and the resulting inability to give assistance to the infantry.
X1	(e)	the only means of communication between the
	•	infantry and the tanks was by means of radios available to company and battalion commanders. There were no telephones on
		the tanks and individual communication was impossible.
	(f)	MLR tank units were 25
	•	Intended for exploitation missions, the tanks 25 which were intended for infantry support during an attack were
		located never more than 400 m behind their own infantry lines, and the distance depended on the terrain.
	/ \	
	(g)	Sappers were sent out to neutralize mines prior to an attack;
		they cleared gaps 10 m wide, which were spaced 100 to 200 m apart.
	(h)	all tanks were equipped with some bridging
		material, which was kept on top of the tank on either side of the turret. Each tank carried two wooden planks, 600 x 70 x 20 cm
	(1)	all tanks were equipped with radios.
•		
	(3)	Large mobile tank units were used only for the initial break- through and consolidation of the newly occupied territory.
,		Exploitation of the breakthrough was the job of the mechanized infantry, as was also the pursuit of the enemy.
9. [		training information:
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•	(a)	During the winter training period, not a single movement by motor transport was made, although one such movement was made during
		the summer training period \( \sum_{\text{See}} \) Soviet Summer Training 25

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	(b)	Each week all NCO's had six hours of leadership training, which was conducted by the company commanders. Company officers had similar training which was limited to six hours a menth and was conducted by the battalion commander.	
25X1	(c)	There was no passive air defense training, but barracks were equipped with blackout curtains and emergency lights, to be used in the event of an air raid.	]
	(d)	Alerts were usually conducted once every month; the whole regiment, weapons and equipment, had to be ready to move to a previously designated location within 30 to 45 minutes. Emergency rations and live ammunition were issued. Generally a problem was included in connection with the alert. Most of the time, the problem called for an attack against positions, which were hastily occupied by a hypothetical enemy.	_
25X1	(e)	Political indoctrination had absolutely nothing to do with preparing the troops for combat; its sole purpose was to acquaint the individual soldier with the political structure of the USSR.	
25X1	<b>(1)</b>	defensive CW training consisted of 20 hours of gas-mask drill and gas chamber exercises for every three-month training period. The only items issued each man for the training were a gas mask and a protective cape, both of which had to be returned immediately upon completion of the exercise. Although officially a mask was to be donned in under 12 seconds, the average time needed to don one was about 25 seconds. All of the EM were required to remain in the gas chamber for a period of five minutes.  The consisted of 20 cons	25X 25X1
•	(g)		
	(h)	Practically no night training was given during the winter training phase, and the only time go out at night was during alerts. During the summer training phase, however, night training was conducted on an average of two hours each night and consisted chiefly of patrolling and the employment of infantry tactics. Only blackout lights were utilized in conducting the night training.	25X 25X
	(1)		25X
	(1)	Both the individual soldier and a unit were considered ready for combat after 22 to three months of training.	
	(k)	All units were supposed to be ready for combat after each member of the unit had undergone 22 months of training.	
	(1)	Each soldier in the Soviet Army got to fire the LMG and the SMG PPSh. Thirty hours were allotted for LMG firing during each training phase.  SMG firing,	25X <sup>-</sup>
	<u>,</u> [	50 to 100 rounds (depending on how many he needed) to fire the carbine.	<b>25</b> X1

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10.	The second secon
	/information on NCO training. Every regiment had an NCO school. All soldiers who had completed more than five years
	of grammar school were automatically selected for NCO training. In 1949 the NCO course lasted 11 months. Since 1950 the course has been shortened to six months. The training given to NCO candidates was, in general, the same as that given to ordinary soldiers, with special
	emphasis, however, placed on leadership. All of the instructors in the NCO schools were officers. The schools were set up as separate companies within the regiments, and upon completion of the NCO training, all of the students were made NCO's and assigned throughout their own regiment.
11.	New inductees did not receive any kind of special preliminary training. Upon arrival in the unit, they were immediately assimilated into the unit's normal training schedule.

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